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UNCONSTITUTIONAL MOTIVATION ANALYSIS
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THE
FURTHER DEMISE OF A "WISE AND
ANCIENT DOCTRINE"
The degree to which courts will scrutinize the decisionmaker's motive when pass-
ing on the constitutionality of legislation has been a constantly changing standard
Courts originally conducted the search for unconstitutional motive only with great
hesitation. Gradually, however, they came to view legislative motivation as a more
criticalfactor in determining constitutional questions. "Unconstitutional motivation
analysis," as the inquiry came to be known, has becomeparticularly relevant to first
amendment adjudication. This Note analyzes the efficacy of unconstitutional motiva-
tion analysis, emphasizing itsfirst amendment application. Following a descrption
of the history and nature of unconstitutional motivation analysis, the Nbte examines
its use in first amendment cases, focusing on its most recent application by the
Supreme Court in Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District
No. 26 v. Pico. The Note concludes byproposing an alternative modelfor unconsti-
tutional motivation analysis.
INTRODUCTION
WHEN RULING on the constitutionality of an act, the
Supreme Court generally utilizes three distinct theoretical ap-
proaches in deciding whether to inquire into the legislative body's
motives or the effects of its enactment.' Under the first rubric,
courts look solely at the decisionmaker's motive.2 A second ap-
proach focuses only on the effects of the action taken.3 Finally,
either motive or effects are examined first and, depending upon
what is discovered, the other factor may also be explored.4 The
Court has failed, however, to provide guidance as to the areas of
constitutional adjudication to which each of these modes of analy-
sis applies.
The most controversial of these approaches is the inquiry into
the decisionmaker's motive. Justices Stevens,5 Rehnquist,6 Mar-
l. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 148-49 n.4 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
see also Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 130-31 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2. See Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.
339 (1960).
3. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971); United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 384-85 (1968).
4. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968); Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
5. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 631-35 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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shall,7 and Black8 have argued against examining motive. Com-
mentators, however, have generally viewed unconstitutional
motivation analysis more favorably. 9
This Note examines the efficacy of first amendment unconsti-
tutinal motivation analysis. After tracing the history ° and general
nature of the analysis," several scholars' theories on the subject
are explored. 2 The Note then describes the relationship of un-
constitutional motivation analysis to the first amendment by ana-
lyzing a series of cases from the secondary school setting. 3 The
Note concludes with a presentation of a comprehensive unconsti-
tutional motivation analysis model for first amendment
adjudication.14
I. THE HISTORY OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL MOTIVATION
ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court has vacillated on whether courts should
scrutinize an official decisionmaker's action because it was moti-
vated by an unconstitutional purpose.' 5 The Court initially re-
fused to consider motivation as a possible ground for overruling
legislative action; in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Chief Justice Marshall de-
clared that scrutinizing legislative motive should only be at-
tempted "with much circumspection."' 7 This judicial aversion to
analyzing legislative motive eventually developed into what Jus-
6. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Sonoma County Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 469-70 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J.).
7. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 283 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
8. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971) (Black, J.).
9. See Alexander, Introduction: Motivation and Constitutionality, 15 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 925 (1978); Bice, Motivational.4nalysis as a Complete Explanation of the Just'cation
Process, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1131 (1978); Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An4pproach to
the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motivation and Fundamental Rights in Constitu-
tional Law, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95; Clark, Legislative Motivation and Fundamental Rights in
Constitutional Law, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 953 (1978); Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact
andIllicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional4djudication, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 36 (1977); Ely,
The Centrality and Limits of Motivation 4nalysis, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1155 (1978); Si-
mon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: 4 Motivation Theory of the Constitutional
Ban Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041 (1978).
10. See infra notes 15-35 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 36-74 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 75-88 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 89-148 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 149-54 and accompanying text.
15. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 136 (1980).
16. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87 (1810).
17. Id. at 131.
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tice Cardozo termed the "wise and ancient doctrine that a court
will not inquire into the motives of a legislative body or assume
them to be wrongful.""8
The modem seeds of destruction of this "wise and ancient doc-
trine" were planted in Brown v. Board of Education,19 where a
statute was held to violate the equal protection clause on its face.
The Court's failure to consider legislative motive in Brown led to
legislative schemes which would appear constitutional facially but
which, if scrutinized by courts, might be found to have an uncon-
stitutional effect or to have been motivated by an unconstitutional
animus. Litigation arising over acts motivated by an unconstitu-
tional animus ushered in an age of unconstitutional motivation
analysis, characterized by the Supreme Court's statement in
Gomillion v. Lightfoot20 that "[a]cts generally lawful may become
unlawful when done to accomplish an unlawful end."21
Motivation analysis has not, however, been evenly applied. In
Abington School District v. Schempp,22 for example, the Court re-
marked favorably on its earlier test from McGowan v. Maryland:23
"[I]f it can be demonstrated that [the legislation's] pur-
pose-evidenced either on the face of the legislation, in conjunc-
tion with its legislative history, or in its operative effect-is to use
the State's coercive power to aid religion" 24 then the legislation is
unconstitutional. The Court's enthusiasm for analyzing legislative
motive, however, was short-lived. In United States v. O'Brien,25
the Court confronted a claim that the penalties imposed upon the
respondent for burning his draft card were designed to quell his
freedom of expression. In considering the first amendment issue,
the Court explicitly refused to review legislative motivation, stat-
ing that "under settled principles the purpose of Congress. . . is
18. United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 299 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Ely, Legislative andAdministrative Motivation in Con-
stitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
20. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
21. Id. at 347 (quoting United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324, 357 (1912)). Jus-
tice Whittaker stated "that accomplishment of a State's purpose--to use the Court's
phrase-of'fencing Negro citizens out of' Division A into Division B is an unlawful segre-
gation of races of citizens, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 364 U.S. at 349 (Whittaker, J., concurring) (quoting Gomillion, 364 U.S. at
341).
22. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). Sehempp involved a constitutional challenge to school
prayer.
23. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
24. Id. at 453.
25. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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not a basis for declaring this legislation unconstitutional." 26 The
Court distinguished Gomillion, which it characterized as standing
"not for the proposition that legislative motive is a proper basis
for declaring a statute unconstitutional, but that the inevitable ef-
fect of a statute on its face may render it unconstitutional."'27 The
Court made no attempt to explain Schempp. O'Brien, at least
under a literal interpretation, appeared to signal the end of judi-
cial inquiry into legislative motive. However, it really marked the
beginning of a controversy that rages to this day-whether legisla-
tive motive should properly be examined when determining an
act's constitutionality under the equal protection clause or the first
amendment.
The effect of O'Brien was short-lived. In Board of Education v.
Allen 2' and Epperson v. Arkansas,29 decided the same term as
O'Brien, the Court invalidated legislation because it was enacted
for illicit purposes-purposes which violated the Establishment
Clause. The following year, Justice Harlan, dissenting in Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District,3" found in-
quiry into motive completely proper. He confronted the first
amendment symbolic expression issue in the secondary school set-
ting by indicating that he "would, in cases like this, cast upon
those complaining the burden of showing that a particular school
measure was motivated by other than legitimate school con-
cerns-for example, a desire to prohibit the expression of an un-
popular point of view."'3 1
Justice Harlan's approach attained fruition in 1982. In Board
of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v.
26. Id. at 383.
27. Id. at 384; see also Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971) (also foreshad-
owing the death of motivation analysis).
28. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). InAllen, the Court had this to say about illicit motive: "The
test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and primary effect of the enactment? If
either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of
legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution." Id. at 243 (quoting Schempp, 374
U.S. at 222).
29. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). The Court found that there was "no doubt that the motivation
for the law was. . . to suppress the teaching of a theory which, it was thought, 'denied' the
divine creation of man." Id. at 109. In effect, the Court determined that the purpose of the
legislation "was confined to an attempt to blot out a particular theory because of its sup-
posed conflict with the Biblical account, literally read." Id. Another notable case from this
period concerning motivation analysis is Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Bd., 393 U.S. 233
(1968) (draft board could violate the Constitution when it selects people because it disap-
proves of their views on war).
30. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
31. Id. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Pico ,32 a group of students attacked their school board's decision
to remove certain books from the library shelves of schools within
the board's jurisdiction.33 The Court held that the decisive factor
in determining the constitutionality of the board's action was the
board's motive:
[Wihether petitioners' removal of books from their school li-
braries denied respondents their First Amendment rights de-
pends upon the motivation behind petitioners' actions. If
petitioners intended by their removal decision to deny respon-
dents access to ideas with which petitioners disagreed, and if
this intent was the decisive factor in petitioners' decision, then
petitioners have exceeded their discretion in violation of the
Constitution.34
Thus, Pico represents the complete resurrection of unconstitu-
tional motivation analysis in first amendment cases, notwithstand-
ing O'Brien." To fully appreciate the impact of this resurgence,
the mechanics of unconstitutional motivation analysis must first
be explored.
II. JUDICIAL INQUIRY INTO UNCONSTITUTIONAL MOTIVE
Motive is defined as "something within a person. . . that in-
cites him to action"36 or a "consideration or object influencing a
choice or promoting an action."37 A motive analysis, in its sim-
32. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
33. The school board ordered the removal of the following books: A. CHILDRESS, A
HERO AIN'T NOTHIN' Bur A SANDWICH (1973); E. CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE (1968); Go ASK
ALICE (1971); L. HUGHES, THE BEST SHORT STORIES BY NEGRO WRITERS (1967); 0.
LAFARGE, LAUGHING BOY (1929); B. MALAMUD, THE FIXER (1966); D. MORIS, THE NA-
KED APE (1967); K. VONNEGUT, SLAUGHTERHOUSE FIVE (1969); R. WRIGHT, BLACK BOY
(1945).
34. 457 U.S. at 871 (emphasis in original). The Court cited Mt. Healthy City Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), for the definition of a "decisive factor": "Decisive
factor" means a "substantial factor" in the absence of which the opposite decision would
have been reached. 457 U.S. at 871 n.22.
35. Later (non-first amendment) cases affirmed the resurgence of the inquiry into leg-
islative motive to determine constitutionality. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1976).
36. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1475 (3d ed. unabr. 1971).
37. Id. Contrast the definition of "motive" with that of "purpose." "Purpose" is gen-
erally defined as "something that one sets before himself as an object to be attained" or "an
object, effect, or result aimed at, intended or attained." Id. at 1847. While scholars have
disputed what the Supreme Court means when it uses one word or the other, see, e.g., Ely,
supra note 19, at 1217-21; Clark, supra note 9, at 955-63, most scholars agree that it is a
distinction without a difference. Generally, when courts refer topurpose they are willing to
inquire into the "whys" of a law or decision because the evidence, or the effects of that law
or decision, suggest unconstitutionality. On the other hand, the courts usually will not
19831
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plest terms, inquires into the "whys" of a decision.38 Unconstitu-
tional motivation analysis usually begins with an inquiry into why
the decisionmaker made a particular decision, focusing on both
the objective and subjective processes by which the decision was
made.39 The objective process includes any procedure which the
particular decisionmaking body usually follows when arriving at a
decision, while the subjective process involves the decisionmaker's
state of mind.4" Although the content of the decision may have a
bearing on the decisionmaker's motive, it is seldom the focus of a
motivational analysis. It is assumed that the decisions speak only
examine the decisionmaker's motive, because the evidence before the court appears insuffi-
cient to support a finding of unconstitutionality. See Clark, supra note 9, at 961-62.
38. Alexander, supra note 9, at 927. Motivational analysis must be contrasted with an
effects theory of constitutional adjudication. Effects theorists concentrate on the "what was
done" of the rule enacted; motive is irrelevant to the pure effects theorist. The most vocal
proponent of the effects theory is Justice Stevens. See Rogers v. Lodge, 438 U.S. 613,
631-53 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Effects are the state of affairs produced by an enactment. In most situations an effects
theorist uses the motive of the decisionmaker merely as evidence of the unconstitutional
effects. Concentrating solely on motives creates complex difficulties for effects theorists.
First, it is difficult, if not impossible, to tell which effects are relevant and the reasons for
their relevancy. Suppose no effects are empirically visible but there are clearly improper
reasons for enacting the statute? Only a motivation theory would protect the constitutional
rights of the complaining party. Second, viewing only effects creates difficulties when the
judiciary, for institutional reasons, permits two or more inconsistent effects. Such situa-
tions arise when more than one rule or decision, each constitutional by itself, operate to-
gether to produce prohibited effects. See Alexander, supra note 9, at 927-29.
39. Clark, supra note 9, at 963-78.
40. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV.
341 (1949). In their seminal article, Tussman and tenBroek argue that an inquiry into the
motivation behind a legislature's actions might be the only proper method of adjudicating
constitutional questions in the majority of cases.
It is indeed difficult to see that anything else is involved in these discriminatory
legislative cases than questions of motivation. Hostility, antagonism, prejudice-
these surely can be predicated not of laws but of men; they are attitudes, states of
mind, feelings, and they are qualities of law-makers, not of laws.
Viewed in this light the prohibition against discriminatory legislation is a de-
mand for purity of motive. It erects a constitutional barrier against legislative
motives of hate, prejudice, vengeance, hostility, or, alternatively, of favoritism,
and partiality. The imposition of special burdens, the granting of special benefits,
must always be justified. They can only be justified as being directed at the elimi-
nation of some social evil, the achievement of some public good. When and if the
proscribed motives replace a concern for the public good as the "purpose" of the
law, there is a violation of the. . . prohibition against discriminatory legislation.
Id. at 358-59. Although the authors wrote about violations of the equal protection clause,
modern constitutional adjudication applies many of the same tests and theories to cases
arising under the first amendment. This area of constitutional adjudication is referred to as
"first amendment equal protection analysis." For further discussion of the overlap of first
amendment and equal protection analysis in the public forum and censorship contexts, see
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPREssION 303-307 (1970); Kalven, The Con-
cept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 29-30.
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for those creating them.4'
A pure unconstitutional motive theorist approaches a decision
armed with a set of either proscribed or mandated motives.42 The
motive theorist does not care whether the decision will result in
beneficial effects; the inquiry is restricted to determining what in
the mind of the particular decisionmaker prompted the decision.
The final determination of constitutionality or unconstitutionality
depends upon whether illicit objects or criteria-proscribed or
mandated motives-were substantial factors in the decisionmak-
ing process and whether the same result might be reached if the
legislation were justified by legitimate objectives or criteria.43
A. The Relevance of Motive
Several reasons have been advanced for the judicial inquiry
into a decisionmaker's motive. First, the Constitution is viewed as
a grant of enumerated powers defining the limits of the deci-
sionmaker's authority;' the argument is that illicit motives exceed
the constitutionally imposed limits on the authority vested in a
decisionmaking body.45 Similarly, the Bill of Rights explicitly de-
nies a decisionmaker the authority to act in certain proscribed
areas.
4 6
41. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 40, at 358-59.
42. Mandated motives are those which require specific acts. For example, a law man-
dating that all other laws facilitate freedom of speech would require that every law have as
its purpose the facilitation of that freedom. Proscribed motives are those which are imper-
missible. For example, the Bill of Rights guarantees that no law shall abridge freedom of
speech. See Alexander, supra note 9, at 931.
43. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 9, at 1097-1127.
44. Alexander, supra note 9, at 935. Congress is prohibited from acting without au-
thority specifically defined in the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) ("It]his government is acknowledged by all,
to be one of enumerated powers. The principle, that it can exercise only the powers
granted to it. . . is now universally admitted").
45. See infra text accompanying note 82.
46. The Bill of Rights specifically denies Congress the power to make laws "respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the free-
dom of speech." U.S. CONsT. amend. I. In the case of free speech, motivation may be the
only relevant factor to consider in adjudicating claims of alleged infringement. For in-
stance, Professor Tribe sees two categories of legislation abridging freedom of speech
where motivation is relevant:
First, government can aim at ideas or information, in the sense of singling out
actions for government control or penalty either (a) because of the specific view-
point such actions express, or (b) because of the effects produced by awareness of
the information such actions impart. ...
Second, without aiming at ideas or information in either of the above senses,
government can constrict the flow of information and ideas while pursuing other
goals, either (a) by limiting an activity through which information and ideas
1983]
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Second, an illicit motive may determine the outcome of a deci-
sion, which may, in turn, produce illicit effects.4 7 This illustrates
the interdependence of effects and motive. For example, suppose
a decisionmaker decides to enact legislation prohibiting black
people from wearing green eyeshadow to protest a series of
murders; the ilicit effect is to inhibit freedom of expression and the
ilicit motive is to stigmatize black people.
Third, only the political decisionmaker has the authority to
weigh the fairness and utility of a decision. When an illicit motive
exists, fairness and constitutional neutrality are automatically
jeopardized because the opportunity for a full and proper assess-
ment of the decision is destroyed.
Fourth, the presence of an illicit motive creates a "breach of
faith between the governor and the governed."48
These reasons for inquiring into motive do not exist in a vac-
uum. Any consideration of the relevance of unconstitutional mo-
tivation must also take into account the inherent difficulty in
pursuing an inquiry into motive.
B. The Problems of Motivation Analysis
Critics of motivation analysis deem it improper for courts to
review a decisionmaker's motive.4 9 The motive of a collective
body is said to be difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain, preclud-
ing the motivation from being determinable with constitutional
sufficiency.5" Moreover, even after being found unconstitutional, a
might be conveyed, or (b) by enforcing rules compliance with which might dis-
courage the communication of ideas or information. . . The first form of
abridgment may be summarized as encompassing government actions aimed at
communicative impact; the second, as encompassing government actions aimed at
noncommunicative impact but nonetheless having adverse effects on communica-
tive opportunity.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUrIONAL LAW 580 (1978) (emphasis in original).
47. See generally supra note 9.
48. See Clark, supra note 9, at 964.
49. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971) (Black, J.).
50. Justice Black observed that "it is extremely difficult for a court to ascertain the
motivation, or collection of different motivations, that lie behind a legislative enactment.
...It is difficult or impossible to determine the 'sole' or 'dominant' motivation behind the
choices of a group of legislators." Id. Chief Justice Warren was even more direct:
Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter. When
the issue is simply the interpretation of legislation, the Court will look to state-
ments by legislators for guidance as to the purpose of the legislature .... What
motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what
motivates scores of others to enact it ....
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968).
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decision or law may be reenacted with a constitutional motive.51
A valid and otherwise useful decision also may be declared un-
constitutional because it was enacted with an illicit motive. 2 Fi-
nally, motivational analysis is faulted for improperly validating
inquiry by one branch of government into the good faith decisions
of another.5 3 These arguments against inquiring into the motives
of decisionmaking bodies are generally viewed by commentators
as illusory, and each is now considered frivolous. 4
C. Dissipating the Problems of Motivation Analysis
Justice Black's opinion in Palmer v. Thompson55 argued that
determining the "sole" or "dominant" motivation of a legislature
is difficult, if not impossible. 6 However, simply because an anal-
ysis is difficult does not render it any less necessary; when consti-
tutional principles are at issue, an inquiry into the motives of the
decisionmaking body may be required. Although a legitimate ex-
planation for a decision may exist, a hidden unconstitutional pur-
pose may also exist given all the relevant circumstances 7.5  The
judiciary should not refuse to inquire into motive since the consti-
tutional consequences may be great. Afortiori, if an illegitimate
purpose is the exclusive explanation for making a decision, the
judiciary should closely scrutinize motive. In that case, the motive
would be conclusive evidence of unconstitutionality.
The second objection to an inquiry into a decisionmaker's mo-
tive is that such inquiry may be futile because the law may be
reenacted.5 8 But, as Professor Ely explains, after determining that
an enactment or decision was made with an illicit purpose, courts
will be skeptical of any revision with an allegedly "constitutional"
motive.59 Furthermore, the unconstitutional motive must be the
overriding factor influencing the decision.6" If there are also legiti-
51. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971).
52. Id.
53. See Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 117.
54. See infra notes 55-74 and accompanying text.
55. 403 U.S. 217, 218-27 (1971).
56. Id. at 224-25; see supra note 50.
57. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 619-22 (1982) (citing Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485
F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973), aft'd per curiam on other grounds sub nom. East Carroll
Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1975)) (in equal protection cases the Supreme
Court will consider all relevant circumstances or factors leading to an inference of uncon-
stitutional motivation).
58. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
59. Ely, supra note 19, at 1275-79.
60. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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mate explanations for the decision, courts will not fully scrutinize
the motive factor.6 1 Therefore, since there may be several plausi-
ble justifications for the decision, motivation will not be the deter-
minative inquiry; rather, it will "trigger the ordinary demand for a
legitimate defense."' 62 Finally, sending the law back after striking
it down because it was unconstitutionally motivated tends to legit-
imize the so-called "due process of legislation," allowing the deci-
sionmaker to rethink the law in constitutional terms.63
The third criticism of motivation analysis is its disutility.64
Ilicit motive, however, will invalidate only those decisions which
cannot be supported by legitimate concerns.65 All an enactment
or decision would need to withstand a motivation analysis is some
legitimately defensible purpose. Moreover, inquiry into motive
will come into play only if the illegitimate motivations are a sub-
stantial factor in the decisionmaking process.
The final criticism of motivation analysis, that it is improper
for one branch of government to delve into the affairs of another
branch,66 is easily dispelled. Judicial review of the executive and
legislative branches is a long accepted practice67 which has been
extended to the areas of presidential behavior 68 and legislative
apportionment.69
After the commentators had diluted the criticisms of motive
inquiry, they recognized that the judiciary could properly conduct
a motivation analysis in considering the constitutionality of some
legislative or executive actions. From this conclusion, as Professor
Ely has pointed out, two further conclusions follow. First, in a
practical sense, there are concrete instances where unconstitu-
tional motivation can be inferred.70 Second, intuitively, there are
cases that can be explained only by a motivation theory.7 The
various unconstitutional motivation theories of Professors Ely,72
Brest,7 3 and Clark74 are premised upon these conclusions.
61. Ely, supra note 19, at 1275-79.
62. Id. at 1278.
63. Id. at 1279-80.
64. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
65. Id. at 1280-81.
66. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
67. Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 117.
68. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
69. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
70. J. ELY, supra note 15, at 139.
71. Id.
72. Ely, supra note 19.
73. Brest, supra note 9.
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D. Theories of Unconstitutional Motivation
Professor Ely bases his theory of motivation analysis upon
what he calls the "disadvantageous distinction model. '7 5 He dis-
tinguishes statutes or decisions by who must sustain the required
burden of justification.7 6 When a statute or decision draws dis-
tinctions among persons and disadvantages a select group of those
persons, the government has the burden of justifying those distinc-
tions.7" Consequently, in this situation motive and motivation
analysis are irrelevant.78 However, Ely discusses two situations
where his "disadvantageous distinction" model does not apply
and motive is therefore a proper inquiry.7 9 First, the model does
not apply when the government cannot offer any legitimate reason
for the distinctions it draws.80 Second, Ely's model does not apply
to "discretionary choices"--choices made when the particular de-
cision is not rationally related to "the effectuation of some accept-
able goal."'" Ely would thus subject enactments in these two
categories to review for whether the decisions were unconstitu-
tionally motivated.
Professor Brest's theory of motivation analysis rests on the
premise that proscribed objectives are beyond the authority of of-
ficial decisionmakers-if an illicit objective is proved by clear and
convincing evidence, a court should invalidate the decision.82 In
its simplest terms, Brest's theory is a "but for" test of constitu-
tional motivation: "[A]ssuming that a person has no legitimate
complaint against a particular decision merely because it affects
him adversely, he does have a legitimate complaint if it would not
have been adopted butfor the decisionmaker's consideration of
illicit objectives. 83 The court should review a decision if "it was
designed in part to serve an illicit or suspect objective. '84
Professor Clark borrows the Supreme Court's term "invidious
74. Clark, supra note 9.
75. Ely, supra note 19, at 1207-08.
76. Id. at 1207-08, 1281.
77. Id. at 1207.
78. Id. at 1283.
79. Id. at 1230-32.
80. Id. at 1236-37.
81. Id.
82. See Brest, supra note 9, at 129. Brest would not require the complainant to estab-
lish that the illicit motive was the "sole" or "dominant" factor in the decisionmaking pro-
cess. Rather, the complainant need merely show, by clear and convincing evidence, that it
played an "affirmative role." Id. at 129-30.
83. Id. at 116 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 130.
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motivation," 5 defining it as "devaluing the needs, wants, capabil-
ities, or dignity of members of a group, whether for reasons of
hostility or other prejudice, on the unwarranted assumption that
such group members are less capable than other members of soci-
ety."86 Clark uses this concept of "invidious motivation," along
with the usual constitutional evidentiary determinations such as
suspect classes, fundamental rights, and compelling governmental
interests, as tools to search for mistaken assumptions of lesser
moral worth.8 7 Clark presumes a bad purpose or motive when
there is no proper governmental interest to rebut a suspicion of
unconstitutional motivation. 8
A common thread running through each of these theories is
the basic assumption that unconstitutional motivation analysis
should be employed in first amendment adjudication. This as-
sumption deserves further discussion.
III. THE SPECIAL PLACE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL MOTIVATION
ANALYSIS IN FIRST AMENDMENT ADJUDICATION
Unconstitutional motivation analysis is especially relevant to
cases arising under the first amendment, 9 which explicitly pros-
cribes certain legislative goals: "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or the
press."9° While the decisionmaker has no choice as to which gov-
ernment objectives are forbidden, the scope of the first amend-
ment remains ambiguous.
The first amendment denies government the "power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or
85. Clark, supra note 9, at 966-67; see, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
As the Court observed in Washington,
[t]he central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race. It is
also true that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an equal
protection component prohibiting the United States from invidiously discriminat-
ing between individuals or groups.
426 U.S. at 239 (citing Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)).
86. Clark, supra note 9, at 966-67.
87. Id. at 954, 964, 967.
88. Id. at 983.
89. Although motivation analysis is, and has been, much debated in the equal protec-
tion area, most commentators agree that it has special significance in the first amendment
sphere. L. TsUBE, supra note 46, at 567-608; Clark, Civiland Criminal Penalties and Fo feit-
ures: A Framework/or ConstitutionalAnalysis, 60 MINN. L. REv. 379, 447-49 (1976).
90. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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its content."9' The Framers imposed this restriction with a strong
consideration for history, remembering that dissatisfaction with
government was traditionally silenced by regulation of speech and
religion. Laws regulating the content of speech and the practice of
religion contain the evils which accompany an invidious stigma
upon a class of people, and interfere with society's ability to deter-
mine its own view of politics, religion, morality, and lifestyle.
92
This is especially true when a government's motive is to single out
particular ideas for exclusion. The Supreme Court has consist-
ently held such action unconstitutional.93
A. Yhe Prohibition Against Imposed Homogeneity of Ideas
Regulations that isolate and exclude particular ideas or view-
points from the public sphere are generally considered repugnant
to the first amendment. Milton,94 Holmes' marketplace of ideas
theory,95 Meiklejolm's civic importance theory96 and its expanded
91. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); see also Farber, Content Regulation
and the First Amendment: 4 Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727 (1980). The Court has
occasionally upheld content-based restrictions. See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1
(1979) (first amendment not infringed when statute prohibits use by optometrists of decep-
tive trade names); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (no first amendment in-
fringement when FCC prohibits use of indecent language in broadcasts); Young v. Ameri-
can Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (zoning to regulate "adult movie" theaters does not
interfere with exhibition of films protected by first amendment); Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (prohibiting political advertising on city buses rationally re-
lates to legitimate government interests).
92. This is de "purposive" view of the first amendment, which recognizes four func-
tions served by freedom of expression in a modem democratic society: assuring individual
fulfillment, attaining the truth, securing societal participation in the decisionmaking pro-
cess, and balancing stability and change. See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of. the
FirstAmendment, 72 YALE LJ., 877, 878-79 (1963). But see L. TRIBE, supra note 46, at 576
(first amendment cannot be adequately conceived of in "purposive" terms).
93. See infra notes 104-27 and accompanying text; see also L. TRIBE, supra note 46, at
899-905.
94. J. MILTON, AEREOPAGITICA, A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINT-
ING, To THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND (Everyman's Library ed. 1927).
95. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The fol-
lowing statement is generally recognized to be Holmes' position on first amendment
jurisprudence:
When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come
to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct
that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competi-
tion of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out.
Id. at 630.
96. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 46, at 577 (stating that Meiklejohn's theory is "that free
speech is protected by the first amendment as essential to intelligent self-government in a
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versions,97 Harlan,98 and Brandeis99 all evidence a particular dis-
taste for such regulations. One type of regulation which provokes
the first amendment controversy is action by school boards to
limit or exclude ideas from the classroom.
A school board's attempts to control students' ideas creates a
constitutional conflict of complex proportions. On the one hand,
the school board has a duty to prepare the individual for citizen-
ship and economic independence, inculcate values of the commu-
nity, and preserve the security of the state.1" Statutes or state
constitutions therefore give the school board plenary power to
prescribe the curriculum and purchase needed materials for the
school system's operation.' As the Supreme Court has consist-
ently recognized, 10 2 content based judgment, and hence regula-
tion, are unavoidable in this context. Conversely, a basic
democratic system" and that based on this theory "the special guarantees of the first
amendment [should be limited] to public discussion of issues of civic importance").
97. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231, reh'g denied, 433 U.S. 915
(1977) ("our cases have never suggested that expression about philosophical, social, artistic,
economic, literary or ethical matters ... is not entitled to full First Amendment protec-
tion"); see also, L. TRIBE, supra note 46, at 577 (observing that Meiklejohn's theory can
legitimately be expanded to protect these areas since they may "indirectly contribute to the
sophistication and wisdom of the electorate").
98. In Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), the Court observed that the constitu-
tional right of free expression puts
the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us,
in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable
citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would
comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our polit-
ical system rests.
Id. at 24 (Harlan, J.).
99. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to
make men free to develop their faculties. . . .They valued liberty both as an end
and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage
to be the secret of liberty.
Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring).
100. See generally Hare, Decisions of Princile, in READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
EDUCATION 171 (1958) (all teaching is the teaching of principles, forcing the learner to
make his own decisions); Belok, Schoolbooks, Pedagogy Books, and the Political Socializa-
tion of Young Americans, 12 EDUC. STUD. 35 (1981) (governments inculcate societal norms
into the attitudes of their school students); Reynolds, Textbooks: Guardians of National-
ism, 102 EDUC. 37 (1981) (governments impose upon their young a reflection of the values,
goals; and essential priorities of their particular societies).
101. Seitz, Supervision of Public Elementary and Secondary School Pupils Through State
Control Over Curriculum and Textbook Selection, 20 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 104 (1955)
(subject to federal constitutional limitations, state has plenary power over education, and
through constitutional and legislative provisions this power can be exercised by school
boards with plenary power to control their curricula in order to inculcate values and en-
hance intellect of students).
102. See infra notes 104-20 and accompanying text.
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constitutional doctrine holds that a governing institution cannot
exercise power designed to dominate the mental processes of those
governed.10 3 The clash of these two diametrically opposed consti-
tutional principles creates problems with which the Supreme
Court has struggled over the past sixty years, and to which moti-
vation analysis is the only viable solution.
B. The Cases From Meyer to Tinker
In loosening the tension between the first amendment's com-
mitment to heterogeneity of ideas, and the acknowledged duties
and powers of local boards, the Court has insisted that whatever
may be the inculcative mandate of local authorities, "the First
Amendment. . .does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of ortho-
doxy over the classroom."'" Furthermore, no speech or content-
based classification, whether a march, rally, film, or book, may be
prohibited merely because some arm of the state government dis-
approves of the ideas it expresses.' 0 5
In Meyer v. Nebraska, °6 the Court struck down a statute that
prohibited the teaching of foreign languages below the ninth
grade in any public or private school. 107 The Court recognized
the legislature's interest in regulating school curricula, noting that
"[t]he desire of the legislature to foster a homogeneous people
with American ideals prepared readily to understand current dis-
cussions of civic matters is easy to appreciate."' 1 8 Nonetheless,
after acknowledging this function of the state educational machin-
ery the Court restricted it, warning that "individual. . .funda-
mental rights . . . must be respected."' 19 While the Court
conceded that the state could prescribe a curriculum, it found no
emergency situation that could justify the first amendment in-
103. See L. TIUBE, supra note 46, at 899-903. Tribe observes that
[t]he invasion of this protected sphere of "intellect and spirit" produced by com-
pelling an individual to express beliefs and convictions, whether actually held or
only vacantly mouthed, represents a particularly insidious regulation, in order to
shape the mind itself, of the expressive end of that spectrum which runs from
private perception to public participation.
Id.
104. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
105. See Police Dep't. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
106. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
107. Id. at 397, 402-03.
108. Id. at 402. Indeed, the Court felt that "the State may do much, go very far indeed,
in order to promote the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and morally." Id. at
401.
109. Id. at 401.
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fringement. The Court therefore held that the statute bore no ra-
tional relation to any legitimate state interest.110
Meyer was only the beginning of the Court's delineation of the
power a transient political majority could use to impose "homoge-
neous" values. In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Bar-
nette," ' the Court considered the state's power to encourage
allegiance to the flag's values and precepts. While noting that
"[n]ational unity as an end which officials may foster by persua-
sion and example is not in question,"" 2 the Court viewed the
deeper issue in Barnette as whether that end could be pursued by
eliminating dissenting values. In holding that the state possessed
no such power, the Court had "no fear that freedom to be intellec-
tually and spiritually diverse or even contrary will disintegrate the
social organization." '13
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 4 the Court invalidated a
statute aimed at preventing "subversives" from teaching in public
schools. While acknowledging the classroom as a proper place for
inculcating values, the Court found that the first amendment im-
posed upon the judiciary an obligation to preserve heterogeneity
in the schools. The Court stated that American schools are "pecu-
liarly the 'marketplace of ideas'" 1 5 and that "[tihe Nation's future
depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that ro-
bust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of
tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative
selection."" 6
These same themes emerge in Epperson v. Arkansas" 7 and
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District. 18 In Epperson,
the Court exhibited a hostility to the imposition of orthodoxy in
the school setting, stating that the Arkansas legislature "sought to
prevent its teachers from discussing the theory of evolution."'1 9
110. Id. at 403.
111. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
112. Id. at 640.
113. Id. at 641.
114. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
115. See supra note 95.
116. 385 U.S.at 603 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372
(S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
117. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
118. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
119. Id. at 107. "The State's undoubted right to prescribe the curriculum for its public
schools does not carry with it the right to prohibit.. . the teaching of a scientific theory or
doctrine where that prohibition is based upon reasons that violate the First Amendment."
Id.
286 [Vol. 33:271
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In Tinker, the Court quoted Meyer in rejecting "the principle that
a State might so conduct its schools as to 'foster a homogeneous
people."" 2
C. The Secondary School Book Removal Cases
The major use of unconstitutional motivation analysis in first
amendment adjudication has occurred in the school book cases,
where the issue is whether a student's first amendment freedoms
are infringed when a local school board removes books from the
library shelves of a public school. 121 A government's use of text-
120. Id. at 511 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1922)).
121. The list of curriculum and library disputes heard in the federal courts since Tinker
is long. Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d
Cir.), ceri. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972), is the first case. In Presidents Council, the issue was
whether the removal of a book from a public school's library infringed a student's first
amendment rights. The court deferred to the judgment of the school board, refusing to
delve into "either the wisdom or the efficacy of the determinations of the Board," 457 F.2d
at 291, and holding that, since the book could be purchased outside the school library and
class discussion of the book was not prohibited, no first amendment violation had occurred.
Id. at 291-92.
In Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976), the Sixth
Circuit held that the school board's removal of a book from a school library solely because
the book's contents were distasteful to the board's social or political views violated the
students' first amendment rights. Id. at 582. The court criticized the board's reliance on
personal standards instead of objective educational criteria in its book evaluations. Id.
Calling the school library a "forum for silent speech," id. at 583, the court held that book
removal is justified only under circumstances which are "neutral in First Amendment
terms," id. at 582, e.g., where the book is obsolete, worn out, or occupying shelf space that
could be better utilized. Id. at 581. The Sixth Circuit found a first amendment violation in
the denial to students of the "right. . . to receive information which they and their teach-
ers desire them to have." Id. at 583.
The Seventh Circuit sharply disagreed with Minarcini in Zykan v. Warsaw Community
School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980). There, as in Minarcini, plaintiffs argued that
book removal interfered with the students' right to know and their right to academic free-
dom, and that defendants had acted according to their own social, political, and moral
tastes. Id. at 1302. Narrowing its discussion to the academic freedom issue, the Zykan
court held that secondary school students have, at the very least, an interest in academic
freedom through the "qualified freedom to hear." Id. at 1304. However, the court used a
parenspatriae rationale to curtail academic freedom for secondary school students, whose
underdeveloped academic abilities created a compelling state interest in determining which
books should fill the school library's shelves. To prevail, the students were required to
demonstrate that the school board was imposing an exclusive ideological orthodoxy upon
them. Id. at 1305-06.
In Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1981), plaintiffs alleged a first amendment
violation when a school superintendent determined that the play "Pippin" was inappropri-
ate for a public high school drama production because of its sexual content. The Third
Circuit found that the school's spring musical program did not differ in principle from the
selection of curricula or libary books, id. at 216, and confirmed the district court's findings
that "no student was prohibited from expressing his views on any subject; no student was
prohibited from reading the script, an unedited version of which remains in the school
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book and library book selection to influence the morals and poli-
tics of its young has roots in antiquity,1 22 and early American
educators considered fundamental the use of textbooks to social-
ize the young.' 23  Unity of thought and lan-
guage-homogeneity-was understood to be desirable, if not
necessary, for the survival of the young nation.1"
library and no one was punished or reprimanded for any expression of ideas." Id. The
court also found that time and resource limitations required that certain curriculum deci-
sions be made, and that "since the objective of the educational process is the 'inculcation of
both knowledge and social values' in young people, these decisions as to what will be
taught will necessarily involve an acceptance or preference of some values over others."
Id. Thus, the court affirmed the ruling below that cancellation of the "Pippin" production
did not infringe the students' first amendment rights. Id.
In Pratt v. Independent School Dist. No. 831, 670 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1982), the court
held that removal of the film "The Lottery" unconstitutionally infringed students' first
amendment rights. Id. at 776. The district court found, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed,
that the school board could not constitutionally ban a film merely because the majority of
the board members objected to its religious and ideological content and wanted to prevent
ideas contained in the material from being expressed in the school. The Board argued that
the film was too violent, but failed to show a substantial and reasonable state interest which
justified interfering with the students' right to receive the information contained in the film.
Teachers testified that "The Lottery" was faithfully adapted from the short story and was
an effective teaching tool which would involve students who might not otherwise read the
story. The board's failure to specify why the films were too violent or how they distorted
the short story led the court to infer that concern over violence was mere pretext for the
board's desire to express an "official policy with respect to God and country of uncertain
and indefinite content which is to be ignored by pupils, librarians, and teachers at their
peril." Id. at 799. The court concluded that the board had used its official power to "per-
form an act clearly indicating that the ideas contained in the [film] are unacceptable and
should not be discussed or considered." Id.
The most recent school book removal case is Sheck v. Baileyville School Comm., 530 F.
Supp. 679 (D. Me. 1982). The Sheck court granted an injunction to reinstate Glasser's 365
DAYS to the library shelves, reasoning that the school board's ban of the book was over-
broad, and that the board may not exclude information from students.
122. In order to indoctrinate its young with the societal values and develop what it
considered ideal citizens, Sparta assembled all seven-year-old males into barracks and en-
trusted their education to official guardians of the state. W. DURANT, THE LIFE OF
GREECE 82 (1939). Probably the most celebrated example of government intervention in
the socialization of its young was Socrates' trial for indoctrinating the nation's youth with
"wrong" ideas. The government served him a cup of hemlock as punishment. Id. at
452-53; see THE APOLOGY, PHAEDO, AND CRITO OF PLATO (B. Jowett trans. Anchor 1973)
(in the Apology, Socrates defends himself against accusations that he is a corrupter of
youth; in Phaedo, a pupil recounts Socrates' last hours in prison). See generally R. ALLEN,
SOCRATES AND LEGAL OBLIGATION 18 (1980) (stating that the charge of atheism was
merely a procedural device to bring Socrates to trial, and that the real reason for his execu-
tion was that he corrupted the youth). Meanwhile, the Chinese emperor Ch'in Shih
Huang-ti, who ordered the erection of the Great Wall, also had all the books burned to
prevent the nation's youth from remembering the values of past dynasties. W. DURANT,
OUR ORIENTAL HERITAGE 694-98 (1935); see also J. HAY, ANCIENT CHINA 83-84 (1973);
Y. YAP & A. COTTRELL, THE EARLY CIVILIZATION OF CHINA 58, 77 (1975).
123. See supra note 100.
124. See Belok, supra note 100, at 35, 36, 38-39, 45-46.
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The federal courts, therefore, rarely interfered with book re-
moval or selection in the nation's school systems. In the 1970's
and early 1980's, however, the courts became much less hesitant to
do so.125 Issues raised in a series of decisions now known as the
"book removal cases" '26 reached the Supreme Court in the cele-
brated case of Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School
District No. 26 v. Pico. 127
D. Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School
District No. 26 v. Pico
In September 1975, the school board of the Island Trees Union
Free School District No. 26 on Long Island, New York attended a
conference sponsored by a politically conservative parents group
concerned with the values taught in the New York public school
systems. 128 At this conference, the board members obtained a list
of books which the group had determined were objectionable and
unsuitable for students. 129 The board subsequently ordered that
books appearing on the list be removed from the shelves of the
libraries in the school district. 130 When publicity concerning the
board's actions prompted public inquiry, the board, in an effort to
justify its order, issued a press release describing the books as
"anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and just plain
filthy."'' 31 A book review committee was formed which recom-
mended that some of the books be retained and that two of the
books be removed.' 32 The board rejected the committee's findings
and ordered the books "removed from elementary and secondary
libraries and [from] use in the curriculum."'1 33
A student group brought suit, and the district court granted the
school board's motion for summary judgment. 34 The Second
Circuit reversed, holding that the record was insufficient to sup-
125. See supra note 121. See generally Harpaz,4 Paradigm of First Amendment Dilem-
mas; Resolving Public School Library Censorshio Disputes, 4 W. NEw ENG. L. Rav. 1
(1981); Niccolai, The Right to Read and School Library Censorship, 10 J.L. & EDUC. 23
(1981).
126. See supra note 121.
127. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
128. Id. at 856.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 857.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 857-58.
133. Id. at 858.
134. Id. at 858-59.
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port summary judgment.'35 Judge Sifton concluded that the stu-
dents should have had the opportunity to show that the board's
actions "were simply pretexts for the suppression of free
speech."'136 The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's
opinion.
1. Justice Brennan's Plurality Opinion
The Supreme Court struggled in Pico to determine which first
amendment right the school board had infringed. Justice Brennan
proceeded cautiously, limiting the scope of his opinion to the re-
moval of "library books, books that by their nature are optional
rather than required reading."' 137 This voluntary/compulsory dis-
tinction was significant for the plurality. While a school board's
duty to inculcate values may endow it with farreaching discretion
in matters of curriculum planning, the same cannot be said for its
decisions regarding the content of the school library. 38 The in-
culcative function is properly confined to "the compulsory envi-
ronment of the classroom,"'' 39 having no place in the school
library where "the regime of voluntary inquiry . . . holds
sway." 140
Thus, while the discretion of local school boards to manage
school affairs is undeniably broad, the Court felt it should not go
totally unfettered. 14  Such discretion "must be exercised in a
manner that comports with the transcendent imperatives of the
First Amendment" 42 -the right to receive information and ideas.
To guide the lower courts in determining whether a local
school board has abused its discretion in restricting student access
to alternative views, Justice Brennan announced a motivation
analysis test:
Our Constitution does not permit the official suppression of
ideas. Thus whether petitioners' removal of books from their
school libraries denied respondents their First Amendment
rights depends upon the motivation behind petitioners' actions.
If petitioners intended by their removal decision to deny re-
spondents access to ideas with which petitioners disagreed, and
135. Id. at 860.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 862 (emphasis in original).
138. Id. at 869.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 864-65.
142. Id. at 864.
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if this intent was the decisive factor in petitioners' decision,
then petitioners have exercised their discretion in violation of
the Constitution. To permit such intentions to control official
actions would be to encourage the precise sort of officially pre-
scribed orthodoxy unequivocally condemned in Barnette. 43
Justice Brennan remanded the case to the district court to apply
this motivation test in determining whether the school board's de-
cision was made with the proscribed intent.1"
2. Justice Blackmun's Concurrence.
Justice Blackmun disagreed with the plurality on the nature of
the first amendment right involved in the school book removal
cases.' 45 Rather than focusing on the students' right to receive
ideas, he viewed the issue as whether the board's action amounted
to involving improper "state discrimination between ideas."'14 6
Justice Blackmun advocated a balancing approach, weighing the
inculcative function of the local school system against the first
amendment's "bar on 'prescriptions of orthodoxy.' ""' For him,
the proper balance would be achieved "by holding that school of-
ficials may not remove books for the purpose of restricting access
to the political ideas or social perspectives discussed in them,
when that action is motivated simply by the officials' disapproval
of the ideas involved."'' 48
III. IN SEARCH OF AN ANALYSIS: A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE
MOTIVATION ANALYSIS MODEL
This Note enunciates a general motivation analysis to accom-
modate the conflicting constitutional principles affecting the first
amendment's guarantee of free access to ideas. The proposed
standard is that for free speech problems regarding the exchange
of ideas, the challenging party establishes a first amendment viola-
tion by showing that the decisionmaker's action was motivated
solely by ideological considerations likely to compromise the right
to acquire information or ideas, or subtly to influence the party's
143. Id. at 871 (emphasis in original).
144. Id. at 875.
145. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 878-79 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted). Justice Blackmun
elaborated in a footnote: "In effect, my view presents the obverse of the plurality's analy-
sis: while the plurality focuses on the failure to provide information, I find crucial the
State's decision to single out an idea for disapproval and then deny access to it." Id. at 879
n.2.
147. Id. at 879 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 879-80 (Blackmun, J., concurring)(emphasis in original).
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beliefs by imposing a majoritarian ideology. Under this standard,
the court would examine the decisionmaker's motive: if that mo-
tive is to advance or inhibit a particular point of view, then the
action exceeds the scope of the decisionmaker's administrative
power and violates the first amendment. Therefore, actions which
would be deemed first amendment violations are those which: (1)
serve the ideological interests of a vocal minority, (2) employ the
organs of government for essentially doctrinal purposes, or (3) use
governmental means to serve ideological ends where secular
means would suffice.
A burden of proof model would ensure that this standard is
met. Initially, the burden would be on the challenging party to
show that the decisionmaker acted with an unconstitutional mo-
tive or a deliberate policy to deny or impose a particular ideologi-
cal viewpoint. Several factors might justify the inference of
unconstitutional motive: (1) there is no evidence that the decision
furthered a legitimate government interest;14 9 (2) narrow interest
groups were decisively influential in the decisionimaking process;
(3) the decision's effects were not considered; (4) the deci-
sionmaker failed to consult experts or those knowledgeable in the
field; '150 (5) the decisionmaker did not follow the regular proce-
dures of the decisionmaking process;'5 1 (6) the act did not affect
all people uniformly; (7) the decision suffered from vaguely ar-
ticulated purposes; 152 or (8) others in a position comparable to
that of the challenging party were also affected. If the burdened
party proves by clear and convincing evidence that the deci-
sionmaker acted with a deliberate motive to impose or deny access
to a particular ideological viewpoint, a presumption of unconstitu-
tional motive would arise,1 53 which the decisionmaker could rebut
by demonstrating a legitimate government purpose for the action.
Acknowledging the duty of the school board to prepare and
educate the young, 54 the burden of proof model would leave con-
siderable discretion with the decisionmaker. School systems could
still teach the values of their respective communities. What they
149. See, e.g., Pratt v. Independent School Dist. No. 831, 670 F.2d 771, 777-78 (8th Cir.
1982).
150. See, e.g., Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 874-75 (1982).
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., id at 872-73.
153. If the plaintiff fails to meet this burden, a directed verdict for the defendant would
be appropriate.
154. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
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could not do is regiment community values by excluding alterna-
tive viewpoints.
CONCLUSION
Despite the reluctance of Chief Justices Marshall and Warren
and Justice Cardozo to examine a decisionmaker's motive, that
"wise and ancient doctrine"' 155 no longer fully applies to first
amendment cases after Pico. '56 Courts should not hesitate to in-
quire into the motives of a decisionmaking body when faced with
a first amendment challenge. The goals of the first amendment in
a modern democratic society are too fundamental to be thwarted
by blatant or subtle attacks on freedom of speech.
Courts should also recognize the various methods by which
decisionmakers may chill first amendment freedoms.' 57 To fur-
ther the aims of the first amendment, courts should adopt a simple
burden of proof model.'58 The application of such an analysis
will free society from laws restricting citizens' rights to free
speech.
JOHN DONOVAN
155. See supra notes 89-148 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 94-127 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
